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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
EVAN GARTH WESTENSKOW, 
Plaintiff-Appellant , : 
v s . Case No. 14436 
) 
GLORA WESTENSKOW, 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a divorce act ion. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was t r i ed to the Court without a j u ry . The Dis t r ic t Court 
awarded Glora Westenskow the divorce and in the dec ree provided for 
automat ic i nc reases in alimony and support money payments ; and in addition 
divided the m a r i t a l es ta te by giving approximately 85% to Glora Westenskow 
with only 15% to Evan Westenskow. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Evan Garth Westenskow seeks on this appea l , 
(a) A modification of the t r i a l cou r t ' s Decree of Divorce el iminating 
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in P a r a g r a p h 6 the automatic i n c r e a s e s in alimony payments with both par t i es 
being left to avail themse lves of rel ief contemplated by Section 3 0 - 3 - 5 , Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, and 
(b) A modification of the t r i a l cou r t ' s Decree of Divorce eliminating 
the automatic i n c r e a s e s in child support payments leaving the pa r t i e s to avail 
t hemse lves of rel ief contemplated by Section 3 0 - 3 - 5 , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
and 
(c) A modification of the t r i a l cou r t ' s Decree of Divorce to provide 
for an equitable division of the m a r i t a l es ta te of the p a r t i e s , that i s , 50% to 
each pa r ty . 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Evan Garth Westenskow, the Plaintiff and Appellant, will hereinaf ter 
be r e f e r r e d to as the Plaintiff or where appropr i a t e , by his n a m e . Glora 
Westenskow, the Defendant and Respondent , will here inaf ter be r e f e r r ed to 
as the Defendant, o r where app rop r i a t e , by he r n a m e . 
nR , ! r e f e r s to a page re fe rence in the r eco rd of the c a s e . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Evan Garth Westenskow brought an action for divorce against Glora 
Westenskow alleging menta l c rue l ty (R 1). Glora Westenskow countercla imed 
and sought a divorce in her own right (R 7). The case was heard by the 
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde in Weber County, Utah. The Plaintiff , Evan 
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Westenskow, indicated his will ingness to pay reasonable amount for the support 
of the minor chi ldren of the pa r t i e s (R 132, 201). He contended that there 
should be no alimony (R 164) and that the mar i t a l es ta te of the pa r t i e s ought 
to be equally divided, that i s , 50% to each of the pa r t i e s [R 198, 201 , 203, P i ' s 
Exhibit F (Appendix, Page 29)]. The p a r t i e s , through their respec t ive counsel , 
submit ted the i r p roposa ls with respec t to the proper ty division to the court at 
the t r i a l of the case [P i ' s Exhibit F and Def !s Exhibit 5 (Appendix, Pages 29, 30)]. 
The essent ia l facts a r e not in dispute: The pa r t i e s were m a r r i e d at Salt 
Lake Ci ty , Utah on December 17, 1969 (R 1, 7). Two chi ldren have been born 
as i s sue of the m a r r i a g e : Jason Evan, born November 18, 1971, and Anjalee, 
bo rn March 16, 1974 (R 114). At the t ime of the t r i a l , the chi ldren were in 
the custody of M r s . Westenskow (R 114). The pa r t i e s were in the p rocess of 
purchas ing a home in Ogden (R 114). Glora Westenskow, at the t ime of the 
t r i a l , was occupying the home with the two chi ldren while Evan Westenskow 
was living in Salt Lake City (R 113, 114). Evan Westenskow graduated 
from the Univers i ty of Utah in 1972 (R 119). When he finished his college 
educat ion, he was employed by Burroughs Corporat ion where he worked for 
approximately th ree y e a r s (R 120). He was a marke t ing represen ta t ive 
o r s a l e sman in t e r r i t o r i a l s a l e s (R 120). In August of 1975, he te rmina ted 
his employment at Burroughs (R 120). He had often d iscussed with 
Glora Westenskow his d e s i r e s to become self-employed and have his own 
bus iness (R 121). His plans had been to work for a good company for a 
shor t period of t i m e , gain some experience and then t r y and get into bus iness 
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for himself (R 121). The divorce action had nothing to do with his 
t e rmina t ion at Burroughs (R 121). The opportunity for sel f -employment 
came in Ju ly , and he had to exe rc i se the option and take advantage of that 
opportunity (R 121). The m a r i t a l difficulties p r io r to the te rminat ion of 
his employment had been a d e t e r r e n t to a be t t e r opportunity with Burroughs 
( R 121 , 122). He doubted that he would be given other and further 
opportunity with the company (R 122). So he took advantage of the bus iness 
opportunity when it a ro se (R 122). He bought a d i s t r ibu torsh ip for an 
indus t r ia l cleaning company, Brute of Utah, Inc . (R 122, 123). 
The following Exhibits were introduced by Evan Westenskow and 
rece ived into evidence as being i l lus t ra t ive of his tes t imony , copies of which 
Exhibi ts a re attached here to- (See Appendix): 
Exhibit A - Balance Sheet of Asse t s and Liabi l i t ies (R 126) 
Exhibit B - Debts and Obligations Owing at the Time of T r i a l (R 127) 
Exhibit C - Balance Sheet Statement of Evan Westenskow's Company -
Brute of Utah, Inc. (R 127) 
Exhibit D - Evan Westenskow's Monthly Living Expenses (R128) 
Exhibit E - Income for the Months of September and October and a 
Projec t ion for the Following Three Months (R 128) 
Evan Westenskow testif ied at the t r i a l that he was willing to pay 
$75.00 per month for each child and to i nc r ea se the same th ree months 
l a t e r to $100.00 (R 132). 
Exhibit F is a Summary of M r . Westenskow1 s P roposa l for Settlement 
(R 136). 
Glora Westenskow is a college graduate (R 142). She graduated in 
Bus iness Education with a teaching cer t i f icate (R 142). She is in good 
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health and able to pursue that activity (R 142). In addition, Glora 
Westenskow is an excellent s e c r e t a r y and has worked as a legal s e c r e t a r y 
for Adam (Mickey) Duncan in Salt Lake City (R 142). 
The Court in i t s Judgment and Decree of Divorce made the following 
provis ions with r e spec t to alimony and child support : 
n 6 . That defendant is hereby awarded alimony commencing 
November 18, 1975, in the sum of $75.00 per month for a 
per iod of six months and then to inc rease to $100.00 per 
month for a period of six months and then to inc rease to 
$150.00 pe r month for a per iod of four y e a r s and shall 
then t e r m i n a t e , with said payments to be made through the 
Weber County Clerk1 s Office. ; 
7. That defendant is hereby awarded child support commencing 
November 18, 1975, in the sum of $75.00 per month per child 
for a per iod of th ree months after which it shal l i nc rease to 
$125.00 pe r month per child and shall r emain at said level 
until plaintiff 's income r eaches $15,000.00 per year at which 
t ime it shall r a i s e to $150.00 per month per child. If and 
when plaintiff 's income r e a c h e s $18,000.00 pe r y e a r , said 
child support shall be set at $180.00 per month per chi ld, 
payable through the Weber County C le rk ' s Office. f l (R 96, 97) 
With respec t to the m a r i t a l e s t a t e , the Court gave M r s . Westenskow 
nea r ly all of i t - - approx imate ly 85%, leaving only 15% to Evan (R 80, 81). 
F r o m the decision with r e spec t to the automatic i n c r e a s e s in alimony 
and support money payments and with respec t to the proper ty division 
Evan Westenskow appea ls . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
PROVIDING FOR AUTOMATIC INCREASES IN ALIMONY 
PAYMENTS 
It was Evan Westenskow's contention at the tr ial that there should be 
no alimony award whatsoever (R 164)--and certainly not for a five-year 
period. However, the tr ial court in its discretion, decided to allow alimony. 
This reality Evan accepts and on that issue does not appeal. 
But the Trial Court was not willing to stop with what it considered to 
be a fair alimony payment at the time of the tr ial--$75.00 per month. Instead, 
the Court totally ignored the propriety of the parties resorting in the future 
to its continuing jurisdiction to examine the matter of alimony payments and 
with no supporting evidence whatsoever tacked on automatic increases. In 
Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce the Court provided: 
ff6. That Defendant is hereby awarded alimony commencing 
November 18, 1975, in the sum of $75.00 per month for a 
period of six months and then to increase to $100.00 per 
month for a period of six months and then to increase to 
$150.00 per month for a period of four years and shall then 
t e rmina te . . . , ? (R 96) 
For the Court to so provide was an arbitrary abuse of discretion in 
at least four part iculars: (1) there was no evidence whatsoever regarding 
Evan's future financial condition to justify the increases; (2) there is cast 
upon Evan an impossible financial burden; (3) it would be virtually impossible 
for Evan to ever have the Decree modified; and (4) the Decree virtually 
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nullifies the obvious intent of Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
(as amended) . 
There was no evidence whatsoever of Evan ' s future financial 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The re was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that a wage 
i n c r e a s e would be l ikely , o r that expenses would be reduced . Nor is there 
any evidence to suggest that Evan had any hope of finding a new job or 
plans for new employment . On the c o n t r a r y , the evidence shows that at 
the t ime of the t r i a l , Evan was in the ea r ly s tages of a new and struggling 
bus iness (R 122, 125). He is the sole owner (R 123). There was no 
finding nor conclus ion-- indeed the re couldnTt b e - - a s to anticipated future 
i n c r e a s e s in Evan ' s income. In the absence of any evidence of Evan ' s 
future financial c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the t r i a l court acted a r b i t r a r i l y , went 
way beyond all bounds of p roper d iscre t ion and commit ted e r r o r in so 
doing. This Court has said: 
"The Decree in each case must be determined upon the 
f ac t s , the condi t ions , and the c i r cums tances of the pa r t i e s 
in each pa r t i cu la r c a s e . " Hendricks v s . Hendr icks , 91 
Utah 553, 558; 63 P . 2d 277, 279 (1936) 
Fu ture i n c r e a s e s could only be justified by known future 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . What "the f ac t s , the conditions and the c i r cums tances 
of the p a r t i e s " in the future might be is anybody's guess ! 
Under the c i r cums tances then preva i l ing , the t r i a l court determined 
that $75.00 per month would be a fair alimony award . But the cour t , 
not willing to stop at that point , proceeded to a r b i t r a r i l y impose 
automatic payment i n c r e a s e s . 
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But this is not a l l . Not only a re t h e automatic i n c r e a s e s a r b i t r a r y , 
but they a re so onerous as to c rea te an impossible burden . Under the D e c r e e , 
Evan ' s minimum monthly expenses (excluding alimony and child support) will 
total at least $607.07 [R 127-129; P i ' s Exhibits B . D (Appendix, Pages 
25 , 27);R 76]. Evan ' s monthly net income was es t imated at $680.00 [R 128; 
P i ' s Exhibit E ; (Appendix Page 28)]; t h e r e f o r e , under the Decree of Divorce , 
Evan will r ea l i ze a continuing deficit at the following r a t e s : 
Up to six months: $2.07 per month 
6 to 12 months: $27.07 pe r month 
12 to 48 months: $97.07 pe r month 
After the f i rs t y e a r , Evan will be pushed into debt at the ra te of over 
$1 ,000 .00 per y e a r . Such a Decree is unconscionable. This Court has 
said that: 
"The c r i t e r ion for determinat ion of support money is the 
need of the pe rson supported and the Defendant 's ability to 
pay1 ' . Anderson v s . Anderson 110 Utah 300, 307; 172 P . 2d 
132, 135, (emphasis added) 
The evidence shows that Evan s imply cannot pay the amounts o rde red 
by the t r i a l cour t . He will be dr iven into debt at the r a t e of over $1 ,000.00 
per yea r after the f irs t twelve months . But it might be argued that Evan 
would have an i nc rea se in income. But the re i s no supporting evidence for 
that argument — and that is exactly why we have Section 30-3-5 to let the 
Court examine the situation at a l a te r da te . 
The Decree as entered by the t r i a l court vir tual ly nullifies the intent 
of the following pert inent provis ions of Section 3 0 - 3 - 5 , Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended: 
- 9 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The court shall have continuing jur isdic t ion to make such 
subsequent changes or new o r d e r s with respec t to the support 
and maintenance of the pa r t i e s , the custody of the children 
and the i r support and maintenance, or the distr ibution of the 
proper ty as shall be reasonable and n e c e s s a r y . " 
In the light of the financial c i r cums tances prevail ing at the t ime of 
the t r i a l , the Court found $75.00 to be a fair al imony payment. At that 
point the t r i a l court should have stopped and let the par t ies avail themselves 
of the continuing jur isdic t ion of the Court if e i ther party at some future 
date felt that the Decree should be modified. This i s exactly what this 
Court said in the case of MacLean vs . MacLean Utah, 523 P . 2d 862, 863 
(1974): 
"We deem it best that changes in alimony ei ther downward 
or upward should be left to future determinat ion by the 
Court under i ts continuing jur i sd ic t ion . , f 
Under that continuing jur i sd ic t ion ei ther party can seek appropr ia te relief. 
This Court has repeatedly recognized the propr ie ty of the exe rc i se of that 
jur isdic t ion and held: 
"it is a principal now firmly establ ished in this jur i sd ic t ion 
that to entit le e i ther party to modification of a dec ree of 
al imony or child support money, that such party plead and 
prove a change in c i r cums tances such as to r equ i r e , in 
fa i rness and equity, a change in the t e r m s of the d e c r e e . " 
Osmus vs . Osmus 114 Utah 216, 223; 198 P . 2d 233, 236 
(1948) 
The wisdom of the leg is la ture in vesting the t r i a l court with a 
continuing jur isdic t ion is obvious, for no Court is endowed with prophetic 
power to de te rmine what the future holds. In the instant case the t r i a l 
court didn ft even t r y to speculate on the future but s imply provided for 
a r b i t r a r y payment i n c r e a s e s over the y e a r s to come with no supporting 
evidence at a l l . What the financial s ta tus of Glora Westenskow and Evan will Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be six months from the time of the t r ia l , one year from that date, or any 
time during the succeeding four-year period is anybody's guess. The only 
thing that is certain is that $75.00 per month alimony as set by the court 
was fair at the time of the t r ia l . 
In the future, if its jurisdiction were invoked, the Court could 
examine the circumstances then prevailing and compare the same with what 
they were at the time of tr ial and consider the appropriateness of any relief 
being sought. The Court would be functioning in the light of some certainty 
and have some basis for an equitable determination. 
When the Court provided for automatic increases in alimony payments 
it made further review at the instance of Mrs . Westenskow unnecessary. 
Her automatic increases would be guaranteed and completely remove her 
from the established burden of alleging and proving a change of circumstances 
which are required for modification. 
The final aspect of the Court's abuse of discretion with regard to 
the automatic increases in alimony payments concerns the position in which 
Evan is finally left. With no evidence in the record of Evan's future 
financial circumstances, it will be virtually impossible for Evan to ever have 
the Decree modified at the time the increases are to be effective, for under 
current Utah law Evan would be required to allege and prove that his 
circumstances (as compared to what they were at the time of trial) have 
worsened. Osmus, Supra, at Page 223. But at the time of tr ial his 
circumstances were pathetic-- with no indication of what his future financial 
situation would be. He hoped to earn a net income of $680.00 per month 
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over the next th ree months [ R 1 2 8 ; I T s Exhibit K (Appendix J'age 28)]. 
Consider Evan 's burden should he seek a modification of the Decree when the 
automatic i n c r e a s e s become effective. If his c i r cums tances improve at a l l , 
even though he could not possibly pay the automatic i n c r e a s e , he will be in 
an imposs ib le s i tuat ion. Since the re was no evidence whatsoever in the 
r e c o r d of his future financial c i r cums tances at the t ime the i n c r e a s e s a re 
to take effect, the t r i a l cou r t , at any future hea r ing , could only look to the 
financial si tuation at the t ime of the t r i a l . But on that b a s i s , the t r i a l court 
awarded $75.00 per month , and in addition added subsequent automatic 
i n c r e a s e s . The t r i a l court at a future modification hear ing would, no doubt, 
take the view that unless Evan is worse off than he was at the t ime of the 
t r i a l , no change could be a l lowed--even with r e spec t to the automatic 
i n c r e a s e s . And s ince it i s unlikely that Evan would be in a worse financial 
pos i t ion , he could expect no rel ief even though he is being driven further into 
debt and actually unable to pay the esca la ted payments . He will be vir tually 
robbed of an equitable opportunity to have the provis ions of the Decree 
reviewed in the light of future financial c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The problem is 
total ly avoided by el iminat ing the automatic i n c r e a s e s and leaving the pa r t i e s 
to avail themse lves of the type of rel ief contemplated by Section 3 0 - 3 - 5 , 
where at a future hear ing all pert inent facts can be cons idered . 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
PROVIDING FOR AUTOMATIC INCREASES IN CHILD 
SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
The t r i a l court abused i ts d iscre t ion in providing for automatic i nc r ea se s 
in child support payments . Here we a re confronted with the same p r o b l e m s - -
and the same arguments app ly - -as t rea ted under Point I of this Br ie f . 
With r e spec t to child suppor t , however , m o r e must be sa id . At t r i a l , 
Evan expressed a wil l ingness to pay the sum of $75.00 pe r month for the 
support of each of the chi ldren and indicated a wil l ingness to have that amount 
i nc r ea sed in th ree months to $100.00 (R 132, 137). Evan fs proposal of an 
i n c r e a s e in th ree months was not predicated on p resen t or ce r ta in future 
financial c i r c u m s t a n c e s . He wanted to do all he could for the ch i ldren , but 
$75.00 was all he felt he could pay at that t ime (R 132, 136) and the t r i a l court 
so found and held. He had only a hope of earning $680.00 (net) during the next 
t h r e e months [R 135, 136; P l ! s Exhibit E (Appendix, Page 28)]. He even offered 
to subject himself to the court for future examination to expeditiously a s s u r e 
the chi ldren of an appropr ia te support payment ( R 137). The Cour t , no doubt, 
taking i ts cue from Evan ' s offer, went way beyond what had been proposed and, 
without any supporting evidence beyond Evan ' s expressed will ingness to pay 
$100 .00 , proceeded to provide for automatic i n c r e a s e s in th ree months to 
$125 .00 . Specifically, in pa ragraph 7 of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, , 
the court o rde red that: 
The Defendant is hereby awarded child support commencing 
November 18, 1975 in the sum of $75.00 per month per 
child for a period of th ree months after which it shall inc rease 
to $125.00 per month per child. (R 96, 97) 
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There is no bas i s whatsoever for the a r b i t r a r y inc rease from $75.00 
p e r month to $125.00 pe r month. 
It should be kept in mind that Evan fs wil l ingness to accept an inc rease 
after t h r ee months was not based on any cer ta in i nc rease and income: it 
s imply evidenced Evan ' s will ingness to do the best he could for the chi ldren . 
His offer to i nc rea se the payments to $100.00 pe r month should be recognized 
as generous and without evidence that it could be paid. Even the t r i a l court 
s eemed to have been i m p r e s s e d for a payment of $75.00 per month per child 
was all that was r equ i r ed a t the outse t . Cer ta in ly Evan ' s wil l ingness alone 
is no subst i tute for all of the factors that should be considered in imposing 
an i nc rea se in support payments . In providing for the initial i nc rease from 
$75.00 pe r month to $125.00 per month , the court was providing for a 66 2 /3% 
i n c r e a s e - - w i t h nothing but t ime being cons idered . The re is not one scint i l la 
of evidence suggest ing that an inc rease in Evan ' s income would be likely at 
the t ime the i n c r e a s e s were scheduled to take effect, o r at any other t ime in the 
future . Evan test if ied that he could not even speculate as to what his bus iness 
would be after t h r ee months (R 136). He of course hoped it would improve . 
But t he re was no evidence indicating that it n e c e s s a r i l y would. With no 
support ing evidence of other essen t ia l factors r equ i red to be cons ide red , the 
i n c r e a s e s which the court imposed were totally a r b i t r a r y and should be 
e l iminated . 
In addit iontothe initial i n c r e a s e , o ther i n c r e a s e s were imposed based 
solely on Evan ' s poss ible future income. The court o rde red that following 
the i nc rea se to $125.00 pe r month per chi ld, the payments would: 
-14 -
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"remain at said level until Plaintiff1 s income reaches 
$15, 000.00 per year , at which time it shall raise to 
4U50. 00_per-month per child, Jf_and when ^ Plaintiff's income 
reaches $18,000.00 per year , said child support shall be 
set at $180.00 per month per child.11 (R 97) 
In imposing these future increases , the court failed to consider the many 
other factors affecting Evan's financial future. Nothing was mentioned concerning 
future debts, obligations, expenses, needs of the children, etc. etc. etc. Indeed 
all factors affecting Evan's and the children's situation at any given date must 
be the subject of inquiry--not just income. As was pointed out in the Hendricks 
case , Supra, payments under a decree of divorce must be determined on all 
of the facts, conditions and circumstances of the part ies . And there was no 
evidence whatsoever concerning Evan's future financial circumstances. All 
there is in the record is Evan's hopeful projection of what his net income 
would be over the subsequent three-month period [R 135, 136; Pi ' s Exhibit E 
(Appendix, Page 28)]. Automatic increases based solely on Evan's income are 
as arbitrary as increases imposed solely on the passage of t ime. 
Again, the tr ial court either completely ignored, or was not aware of, 
the propriety of utilizing its continuing jurisdiction as provided by Section 
30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Instead, the trial court looked solely to 
future income and the passage of t ime, and imposed the automatic increases. 
The tremendous burden imposed by the automatic increases in child 
support is more clearly seen if viewed in connection with the alimony payments. 
It is undisputed that Evan's net income projected over the three-month period 
at the time of tr ial was estimated at approximately $680.00 (net) per month 
[Pi 's Exhibit E (Appendix, Page 28); R 135, 136]. Under the Decree, his 
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minimum expenses per month, excluding nlimony and child suppor t , totaled 
$607.07 [R 76; R 127, 12D; P i ' s Inhibi t B , U (Appendix, Pages 25 , 27)]. Beyond 
his expenses , Evan had only $73.00 per month for alimony and child suppor t . 
Ini t ia l ly , the combined total of alimony payments and support payments 
amount to $225.00 per month. The resu l t i s an inevitable deficit of $152.07 
pe r month. But look what happens after th ree m o n t h s - - a deficit of $252.07 
pe r month. And after six months the deficit pe r month amounts to $277.07. 
After one yea r the deficit is a s tagger ing $327.07 pe r month. That will amount 
to $3 ,924 .54 pe r y e a r . This s imply por tends financial d i s a s t e r . 
We again cal l the cou r t ' s attention to the s tandard set by this Court 
that the husband 's ability to pay is one of the c r i t e r i a upon which the amount 
of support money must be p red ica ted . See Hendricks v s . Hendr icks , 91 Utah 
553 , 63 P . 2d 277 (1936); Anderson v s . Anderson , 110 Utah 300, 172 P . 2d 132 
(1946). Totally d i s regard ing Evan ' s ability to pay the amounts awarded , the 
t r i a l court o rde red payments to be made which would dr ive Evan into debt at a 
r a t e of a lmost $4 ,000 .00 pe r y e a r . The abuse of d iscre t ion is m o r e than flagrant, 
As a l ready pointed out , the court recognized that under the c i r cums tances 
prevai l ing at the t ime of the t r i a l , $75.00 pe r month pe r child was f a i r , for 
th is is the amount fixed as the initial payment . The t r i a l court should have 
been content to let that support payment stand until e i ther par ty could at 
some future date demons t ra te that the re should be a modification of the D e c r e e . 
The t r i a l court at tempted to justify the t remendous burden by explaining 
that M r s . Westenskow must be at home and present with the chi ldren and 
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that the children must be cared for by the Mother and not the nursery school 
(R 84). Ho one could^question -the me^it-^)f this ideal, but under the 
circumstances, it is obvious that the marriage is already shattered and that 
something less than the ideal is inevitable. That the wife's ability to work 
has definite bearing on the amount of support payments has already been 
established by this Court. In King vs . King, 25 Utah 2d 163, 478 P . 2d 492 
(1970), this Court determined that the divorced wife!s improved health enabled 
her to work, and that therefore, the alimony should be reduced. The wife 
contended that her recently acquired ability to work was not a Substantial 
change of circumstance" to warrant changing the original decree. But her 
ability to work was a change of circumstance, and the court recognized her 
ability as a justification for lowering the payments in the Decree of Divorce. 
From this decision, it is clear that the court must consider the position of 
both par t ies . Nothing more than a fair burden should be imposed. The 
parties simply cannot afford--and the children cannot expect--to have 
M r s . Westenskow stay home all the t ime. It is unthinkable that Mrs . 
Westenskow should expect to stay home and be supported entirely by Evan 
while he is being driven into debt at a rate of $327.00 per month. The 
record shows that she has previously worked and is certainly well-qualified 
to do so (R 142, 143, 175, 195, 196). Even if Mrs . Westenskow were to 
simply work part t ime, she could contribute significantly to her own needs. 
The tax returns of the parties shows what she has earned in past yea r s - -
$3,779.00 in 1969; $6,814.00 in 1970; $3,495.00 in 1971; $1,626.00 in 1972. 
(See tax returns in envelope of Exhibits) 
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Jt is c l ea r from the r eco rd that Evan 's income is ex t remely l imited. 
In the unforseeable fu ture , t he re is no indication that he has prospec ts of 
any different employment . He is s imply in the ea r ly s tages of a new business 
s t ruggl ing to be t te r himself and to be in a position to be t t e r provide for the 
ch i ld ren . • 
We general ly applaud someone with the courage and fortitude to embark 
on a new ven tu re . When famil ies a re together this is something all join in 
suppor t ing . Simply because the re has been a divorce is no r ea son to make it 
imposs ib le for Evan to see what he might do in bus iness for himself. While 
he is s t ruggl ing , the init ial modest r equ i r emen t s of the support Decree should 
s t a n d - - $ 7 5 . 0 0 per month per child. In the months to come , if Evan cannot 
improve the b u s i n e s s , he will have no a l ternat ive than the obvious- - to seek 
new employment . And when he does tha t , t he re will be ample opportunity for 
the pa r t i e s to go before the Court with i ts continuing jur isdic t ion and seek 
equitable rel ief . If Evan succeeds with his b u s i n e s s , then M r s . Westenskow, 
the chi ldren and everyone will applaud him and the re would s t i l l be ample 
opportunity for the pa r t i e s to seek any equitable adjustment . 
In the light of the c i r cums tances prevai l ing at the t ime of the t r i a l , 
t h e r e was no justification whatsoever for providing for automatic i nc reases 
in child suppor t . The Decree should be modified accordingly. 
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POINT III 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO AWARD APPROXIMATELY 85% 
OF THE MARITAL ESTATE TO GLORA WESTENSKOW 
WITH ONLY 15% GOING TO EVAN WESTENSKOW 
In the Decree and Judgment of Divorce , the t r i a l court gave Glora 
Westenskow approximately 85% of the m a r i t a l es ta te while allowing Evan 
Westenskow only 15%. The value of the es ta te and what each par ty was 
awarded is as follows: 
Total net worth of es ta te : $18,778.32 [R 128, 127, 80 , 81 ;P l ? s Ex. 
A, B (Appendix, Pages 24, 25)] 
Net Amount given to Glora: $15,930.88 (approximately 85%, R 81,96) 
Net Amount given to Evan: $2 ,847 .44 (approximately 15%, R 80,96) 
( F o r an exact i temizat ion of the award the Cour t ' s attention is invited to R 80 , 
8 1 , 96. In the analys is above , we have used in each instance M r s . 
Westenskow1 s lower figure of $38,000.00 as the value of the house . See 
R 188.) 
The ffdivisionff i s unconscienable to say the l e a s t ! 
In at tempting to justify such a lopsided award , the t r i a l court in its 
Memorandum Decision explained: 
f ,The in t e r e s t s of the chi ldren come before ei ther of the 
p a r t i e s . The granting of the furn i tu re , washer and d rye r 
and misce l laneous housewares to the Defendant is m o r e 
because the chi ldren need these i t ems than aiy other r e a s o n . " 
(R 84) 
But th is justification was hardly n e c e s s a r y as Evan, himself , had 
proposed that all of the pe rsona l i t ems noted be awarded to M r s . Westenskow. 
See Evan ' s proposed se t t lement [Exhibit F (Appendix, Page 29)]. 
The i s sue in the p roper ty division goes much further than "the 
fu rn i tu re , washer and d rye r and misce l laneous houseware s " . There is no 
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basis for any suggestion or inference that a more even distribution would 
jeopardize the interests of the children. The children could adequately be 
provided for with an even division of the estate. 
Without denying the children any of the "little i tems", an even 
division could easily be achieved by simply increasing the amount of Evan's 
lien on the real property and reasonably modifying the terms of payment 
to avoid any undue hardship on Mrs. Westenskow. 
A fair and equitable division of the property between the parties 
should be the guideline in dividing a marital estate. 
"The wife should receive a fair proportion (of the 
estate) in the light of all the relevant circumstances, 
and should not, on the other hand receive an unfair 
excessive proportion thereof." 2 7 A C . J . S . Divorce, 
Sec. 236(3), Page 1101. 
This statement simply echoes the numerous decisions of this Court. 
But that begs the question: "What is a fair proportion?" 
At one time this Court regarded a one-third (wife)--two-thirds 
(husband) division as being equitable. See Woolley vs. Woolley, 113 Utah 
391, 395; 195 P . 2d 743, 745 (1948). In that case this Court said: 
"in determining generally what a wife is entitled to when 
a divorce decree has been granted to the husband, we 
have considered one-third as being a fair proportion." 
While this Court felt comfortable in establishing the one-third/ 
two-thirds division as a standard in divorce cases , it acknowledged that the 
proportion might vary with the particular facts of any given case. Thus, 
where a wife has significantly contributed to the marital estate, a greater 
proportion has been allowed to the wife up to one-half of the total estate. 
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See Rackham v s . Rackham 119 Utah 2d 593; 230 P . 2d 566 (1951). In that 
c a s e this Court held that in the light of the evidence an equal division of 
p rope r ty was not an abuse of d i scre t ion . Based upon the evidence the 
fifty-fifty division of the es ta te in Rackham v s . Rackham was "just and 
equ i tab le n . 
In Dubois v s . Dubois 29 Utah 2d 75; 504 P . 2d 1380 (1973) th is court 
upheld a 60% (husband) - 40% (wife) division as just and reasonab le . But 
th i s was because the m a r i t a l es ta te was generated chiefly by what the wife 
brought into the m a r r i a g e . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the cu r ren t t rend of our t r i a l court decisions where 
the re is any significant es ta te has been away from the one- th i rd (wife)--
two- th i rds (husband) division to an equal division: 50% - 50%. 
But if the t r i a l court1 s decision in the instant case is to be upheld 
we will have reached the point of near ly giving the whole of a significant 
es ta te to the wife in a divorce proceeding. At leas t the re would be precedent 
for allowing the wife 85% with a pal t ry 15% going to the husband. To uphold 
the t r i a l court would simply open the door to allowing women in this State 
in a divorce proceeding to walk away with near ly everything. We will have 
just about reached the end! 
It is in te res t ing to note that the case was t r i ed on November 3 , 1975 
(R 111). The pa r t i e s had each submitted by way of exhibi ts t he i r respec t ive 
p roposa l s for a p roper ty division. See Exhibit 5 , P l ! s Exhibits A and F . Final ly 
on November 18, 1975, the t r i a l court submitted a Memorandum Decision (R 66) , 
and without deviation gave Glora Westenskow everything she asked for , s imply 
copying he r reques t [Exhibit 5(Appendix, Page 30)] even to the inclusion of 
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a "debt" for which the re is no evidence in the r eco rd whatsoever . Compare 
Exhibit 5 with the Memorandum Decision (R 66). There is no evidence in 
the r e c o r d whatsoever of any debt owing the Bank of Utah. There can be 
no o ther conclus ion-- the t r i a l cou r t , some two weeks after the t r i a l of the 
c a s e , s imply p repa red a Memorandum Decision based solely on M r s . 
Westenskow ! s reques t (Compare Exhibit 5 with the Memorandum Decis ion, 
R 66), even to the inclusion of a debt not evidenced in the r e c o r d . 
The es ta te in this case should be divided between the pa r t i e s 50%-50%. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case we have a glar ing example where a t r i a l court has gone 
beyond all bounds of p ropr ie ty . The abuse of d iscre t ion has been unconscienabl 
A r b i t r a r y i n c r e a s e s in alimony money and support money payments have been 
subst i tuted for the t r i a l cour t ? s continuing jur isdic t ion to fairly examine the 
p ropr i e ty of dec ree modification and a wife without any justification has been 
awarded nea r ly the whole of a significant m a r i t a l e s t a t e . 
The dec ree of the t r i a l court should be modified el iminating from 
pa ragraph 6 the escala ted alimony payment and el iminating from paragraph 7 
the escala ted child support payment . F u r t h e r m o r e , the decree of the t r i a l 
cour t should be modified to provide for a 50% - 50% division. This could 
eas i ly be accomplished with no hurt whatsoever to the chi ldren or M r s . 
Westenskow by simply providing for an inc rease in the amount of the lien 
in pa rag raph 3 of the Decree from $5 ,000 .00 to $11 ,541 .72 . If the decision 
of the t r i a l court in this case is not modified, we will have a d i sas t rous 
precedent in the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submit ted , 
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McKAY, BURTON, McMURRAY & THURMAN 
Macoy n. McMurr j 
Attorneys for Evan Garth Westenskow 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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EVAN GARTH WESTENSKOW 
DEBTS & OBLIGATIONS - Monthly 
NOV. 1, 19 75 
CREDITOR NATURE OF DEBT 
Prudential Federal Savings 1st Mortg. 
Ogden Railway Emp. Cr. Un. 2nd Mortg/ 
Margurite Meeks Loan for homo 
Burroughs Emp. Cr. Un. Living expenses 
First Security Bank BAG Living expenses 
Valley Bank & Trust MG Living expenses 
TOTALS 
v4 ' "" 
<:> 
-25-
01 
25 
3 
4 
33 
7ED 
,107.00 
,000.00 
,350.00 
200.00 
4') " .00 
235.00 
,38 7.00 
PAYMENT 
228.00 
78.07 
100.00 
10.00 
20.00 
15.00 
451.07 
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APPENDIX 
EVAN G. WESTENSKOW - GLORA B. WESTENSKOW 
BALANCE SHEET 
NOV, 1 , 1975 
ASSETS 
Home (1576 Custer) 41,000.00 
Household Furnishings 
Piano 1,200.00 
Furniture 1,000.00 
Washer & dryer 300.00 
Typewriter 450.00 
Misc. Housewares 150.00 
Yard Equipment 150.00 
Stock (Burroughs) 2,6)].75 
(McCulloch Oil) 650.00 
Commissions Due 1,781.25 
Jeep Wagoneer (1972) 3,500.00 
Gulfstream Boat (1974) 800.00 
Yamaha Motorcycle (1974) 750.00 
Net Worth of Business (Brute of Utah Inc.) 665.56 
Total Assets 55,008.56 
LIABILITIES 
1st Mortgage P.F.S. 25,100.00 
2nd Mortgage O.R.E.CU. 3,000.00 
Margurite Meeks 4,350.00 
Total Liabilities 32,450.00 
TOTAL NET WORTH 22,558.56 
IT n 
A L L . ^ •'• t. 
OAT:: .„; //:.3-.7S 
CAT; &.P.OV.9. 
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EVAN GARTH WESTENSKOW 
LIVING EXPENSES - PER MONTH 
NOVEMBER 1, 19 75 
Support of Angic $ 75.00 
Support of Jason 75.00 
Rent (ut i l i t ies included) 175.00 
Food 100.00 
Clothing GO. 00 
Cleaning & Laundry 18.00 
Automobile Expense 35.00 
To i l e t r i e s 10.00 
Insurance (life) i n . 00 
(health - includes children) 32.00 
Household I t ems 15.00 
Miscel laneous 20.00 
$634.00 
r%-\, i.^'.;i:?iT /) u >>-•/:> 
.(\.>c/ "l 
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BALANCE SHEET 
BRUTE OF UTAH INC. 
NOV. 1, 1975 
ASSETS 
Cash in Bank 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventory 
Office Equipment 
Office Supplies 
Automobile ( 76 Pontiac ) 
Total Assets 
$1,574.47 
600.00 
9,332.00 
260.00 
200.00 
6?613.34 
18,579.81 
LIABILITIES 
Accounts Payable for Merch. 250.00 
Notes Payable to Banks 4,500.00 
Interest Payable 124.11 
Notes Payable to those who advanced 
funds to assist in opening the bus.. 6,500.00 
Notes Payable to Credit Unions 
Burroughs 200.00 
Railway Employees 5,925.05 
Commissions owed to Salesmen 115.00 
Total Liabilities > 17,914.16 
TOTAL NET WORTH $ 665.56 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EVAN G. WES'CENSKOW - GLORA B. WES1ENSKOW 
PROPOSED DETERMINATION 
NOV. 1, 1975 
1. Divorce granted to plaintiff, Evan G. Westenskow. 
2. Custody of children to be given to Glora with liberal visitation 
rights to Evan. 
3. Child support of $7.5.00 per child. 
4. Assets equally divided: 
A. Home should be sold, with net proceeds of sale to be applied 
to payment of 1st & 2nd mortgage and to payment of obligation 
to Margurite Meeks, whose loan was used to acquire the home. 
Proceeds should also be applied to pay legal expenses and court 
costs for both parties. 
Anticipated net equity = $3,050.00 
B. Glora to receive Evan to receive 
Jeep 3,500.00 Boat 800.00 
Piano 1,200.00 Motorcycle 750.00 
Furniture 1,000.00 Bedroom set (gift) 350.00 
Washer & dryer 300.00 Yard equipment 150.00 
Typewriter 450.00 Stock 3,261.75 
Misc Housewares 150.00 Commission due 1,781.25 
Equity 2,104.28 Business 665.56 
Equity 945.72 
Glora 8,704.28 Evan 8,704.28 
•tf 
D,Vlf: //••>>• ' r i . 
CA"':. 6.- -JC'/ 7 
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EVAN GARTH WESTENSKOW 
RECAPITULATION OF INCOME 
NOVEMBER 1, 1975 
September ( s t a r t up period) - 0 -
October (full month of operation) $G00.00 (gross) $510.00 (net) 
P ro j ec t ed income for next 3 months $800.00 (gross) $680.00 (net) 
( P e r Month) 
fa/ '.:.;•;-i<; £ 
E 11:3-IS 
^ (c^C?^. ... • 
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MRS. WESTENSKOW'S PROPOSED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
Mrs. Westenskow: Mr. Westenskow: 
Residence of the parties 
1972 Jeep 
One-half of the shares of stock 
Household furniture, appliances 
and equipment excepting one bed-
room set, desk and two chairs 
One bicycle 
One sewing machine 
One typewriter 
One piano 
She will pay first mortgage on 
house and the indebtedness with 
Beckstead Oil Company 
Child support - $200.00 per child 
Alimony - $200.00 per month 
1973 Buick LaSabre or new vehicle 
just purchased 
One-half of the shares of stock 
1974 Gulf Stream Boat 
1974 Yamaha motorcycle 
One/sixth interest in300 acres in 
Wayne County 
Bedroom set, desk and two chairs 
Skis 
Golf clubs 
Guns 
Archery set 
Camera 
Tape deck 
Mr. Westenskow should pay indebtedness 
with Ogden Railway Credit Union, 
Burroughs Credit Union, Bank of Utah 
and any other indebtedness unknown 
to Mrs. Westonskow 
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